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CORPORATE AMERICA STUDIES ABROAD: AN INCENTIVE ANALYSIS OF
TAX INVERSION AND THE COSTS TO CONSUMERS

Thomas J.K. Schick'
"Over and over again courts have said that there is nothing
sinister in so arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low
as possible. Everybody does so, rich or poor; and all do
right, for nobody owes any public duty to pay more than the
law demands: taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary
contributions. To demand more in the name of morals is
mere cant."
-Judge Learned Hand'
INTRODUCTION: TAXES TURNED UPSIDE

DowN

Embroiled in legislative and moral arguments, one of the most
prominent contemporary political and economic debates revolves
around corporate tax inversion. But American consumers cannot be
forgotten in this clash between corporate titans and Washington D.C.
The effects of tax inversion stretch beyond Wall Street and Pennsylvania Avenue; they have significant impacts on Main Street, as well. This
article explores the past and future state of corporate tax inversion with
a focus on the effect the practice and potential solutions have and may
have on consumers.
Stated most simply, tax inversion occurs when a corporation
relocates its legal domicile internationally to lower its tax burden on
corporate income. 2 In practice, tax inversions are transactions where
the corporation becomes a subsidiary of a new parent company that is
Thomas J.K. Schick is a Juris Doctor candidate at the Loyola University
Chicago School of Law, and he earned Bachelor of Arts degrees in political science
and economics from Marquette University. I give my warmest gratitude to Jason
Kurtyka, Lynne Schick, Courtney Guc, and the Vol. 29 Board for their support and
continuous belief in this endeavor.
1 Commissioner v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d Cir. 1947) (Hand,
J., dissenting).
2
Corporate
Inversion,
INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/corporateinversion.asp (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
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domiciled outside the United States, usually through a merger or acquisition. 3 The result of the transaction is a multi-million-dollar discount on the inverting corporation's tax bill.4
Losing billions of dollars in corporate tax revenue to mostly
overseas tax havens vexes both politicians and ordinary tax-paying
consumers. 5 The Obama Administration actively opposed tax inversion and sought to crack down on corporations that invert by closing
loopholes and jointly increasing regulation with the Treasury. 6 From
the perspective of the United States government, the efforts were worth
the potential payout; according to estimates by the Obama Administration, tax inversion would cost the Treasury about $40 billion between
2016 and 2026. The cost of this "loophole," President Obama said,
"[would] come at the expense of middle class families - because that
lost revenue could have been used to invest in our schools, make college more affordable, put people back to work building our roads, and
create more opportunities for our children." 8
Tax inversion is an equally reviled foe to the Trump Administration. 9 In his tax plan, President Trump specifically targets tax inversion and labels it as an "unacceptable . .. symptom" of uncompetitive American corporate tax rates.10 Further, President Trump has
advocated for lowering the repatriation rate-the tax rate on returning
cash stashed overseas to the United States.'I Despite bipartisan support
for reform aimed at slowing tax inversion, neither party has achieved
the largescale modifications they seek.
Part I of this article provides context to the discussion, outlines
Definition of Tax Inversion, FIN. TIMES: LEXICON, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=tax-inversion (last visited Mar. 18, 2017).
4 See id. For example, the merger of Omnicom (United States-based) and
Publicis moved the entity's headquarters to the Netherlands which saved it about $80
million in taxes annually.
See Jeffrey Zients & Seth Hanlon, The Corporate Inversions Tax Loophole: What You Need to Know, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 8, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/04/08/corporate-inversions-taxloophole-what-you-need-know.
6 See id.
See id.
Id.
9 See Trump's Tax Plan, DONALD J. TRUMP, https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/trump-tax-reform.pdf (last visited March 18, 2017).
10
Id.
1 See Joe Harpaz, Weighing the Potential Consequences of Trump's Tax
2016),
13,
(Dec.
FORBES
Plan,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joeharpaz/2016/12/13/weighing-the-potential-consequences-of-trumps-tax-plan/#2e08a4b30518.
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the systemic factors of the global tax system relevant to inversion, and
distinguishes between worldwide and territorial tax regimes. Part II
evaluates the legal framework of tax inversion litigation through a
seminal case and the recent Treasury regulations aimed at quelling tax
inversion. Part III discusses the impact that tax inversion has on consumers. Part IV analyzes the incentives facing business, political, and
consumer actors as they pertain to tax inversion, and it assesses both
"carrot" and "stick" policies. With this discussion in mind, Part V
briefly concludes and highlights several aspects of the proposed solutions.
I. How Low CAN You Go? HOW AND WHY CORPORATIONS INVERT

The goal of tax inversion from a corporation's perspective is to
alleviate its tax burden.12 Two primary tenets of the global taxation
system allow corporations to achieve this goal, namely: 1) Disparities
in corporate tax rates across the world; and 2) a different system of
taxation outside of the United States. 13
A. Global Tax Rates: A Numbers Game
A primary factor that drives inversions is that corporate income
tax rate in the United States is higher than other developed nations. 14
The United States' corporate income tax rate of 35% is the highest
among the thirty-five Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development ("OECD") member nations;' 5 compare the United
States' corporate income tax rate (35%) to the corporate tax rates in
Switzerland (8.5%), Ireland (12.5%), the United Kingdom (20%), and
the Netherlands (25%), for example. Opponents of tax inversion argue
that corporations invert because the American corporate tax rate is
simply uncompetitive.16
Since 1993, the maximum corporate tax rate in the United

See Definition of Tax Inversion, supra
note 3.
13 See Chris Capurso, Burgers, Doughnuts, and Expatriations:An Analysis
of the Tax Inversion Epidemic and a Solution Presented Through the Lens of the
BurgerKing Tim Hortons Merger, 7 WM. & MARY Bus. L. REv. 579, 584-85 (2016).
14 See Table II.1. Corporate Income Tax Rate, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., http://stats.oecd.org//Index.aspx?Queryld=5 8204 (last visited
Mar. 18, 2016).
' See id
See id.; Capurso, supra note 13.
12
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States has been 35%.17 The current rate is still 17% lower than the
rate's twentieth century peak of 52% between 1952 and 1963.1 Many
critics-most notably President Trump-opine that if the United States
19
lowers its corporate income tax rate to 15%, fewer nations will invert.
However, largescale tax reform is unlikely, and if it is achieved, there
must be a reasonable plan to recoup the tax revenue that will be lost by
cutting the rate by more than half.
The disparity between the American corporate income tax rate
and the rate of other developed nations has led some of the America's
largest companies to explore more favorable tax domiciles. 2 1 There is
pressure in the C-suite to increase profits; this desire is echoed by investors who want additional return on their investments. The potential
tax savings stir up interest outside of the C-suite and lead shareholders
22
to pressure companies to invert. In 2014, Pfizer, the world's largest
drug company, made a $100 billion bid to acquire United Kingdombased drug giant AstraZeneca. 3 Pfizer's CEO Ian Read stated that the
acquisition "was a way of improving our capital allocation by getting
2
Pfizer's earnings stream into a competitive tax environment." Pfizer
ultimately discontinued pursuing AstraZeneca, but its attempted inversion illustrates big business' apprehension towards America's uncompetitive corporate income tax rate.25 While an important factor for potential inverters, the corporate income tax rate itself is only half of the
calculus.

17

See JEFFREY L. KWALL, THE FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS,
OWNERS 7 (5th ed. 2016).
1

LIMITED LIABILITY

COMPANIES,

AND

OF
THEIR

See id.

19 See Trump's Tax Plan, supra note 9.
20 See KWALL, supra note 17. Reducing the rate to 15% would represent the

single largest change to the rate in the last century. Id
21 See Matthew Herper, Pfizer's CEO Faces the Drug PricingFirestorm,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/matthe2015),
13,
(Oct.
FORBES
wherper/2015/10/13/why-viagra-keeps-going-up-pfizers-ceo-on-the-drug-pricingcontroversy/#33b9422c66af.
22 See Washtenaw Cnty. Emples. Ret. Sys. v. Walgreen Co., 15-cv-3187,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135080, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 2016) (citing evidence that
activist investors of Walgreen Co. "aggressively" pushed former CEO to move overseas).
23 See id
24 See
id.
25 See id. (stating that Pfizer walked away from the deal when "[t]he proposal generated a firestorm of controversy in Congress and the British government
[and] [i]nvestors were lukewarm").
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B. Worldwide Taxation: No Shelterfrom the Tax Flood
The United States' system of corporate taxation is globally
unique. While most OECD nations use a territorial tax regime, the
United States employs a worldwide system of corporate taxation. 26 A
worldwide taxation system taxes all income earned by United States
corporations, regardless of whether it is earned within the United
States or internationally. 2 7
Excluding deductions or exemptions, the worldwide taxation
regime can be illustrated as follows: Assume that Acme Corporationan American corporation-pays a 35% corporate income tax rate and
earns $10 million of income domestically, $1 million of income in
France, and $1 million in Ireland. As an American corporation subject
to the tax laws of the United States, all $12 million of Acme Corporation's income would be taxed equally, regardless of origin.
A territorial tax system, on the other hand, taxes a corporation's
income by the country in which it is domiciled, but at the corporate tax
rate of the country in which it was earned.2 8 Nearly all OECD countries
employ a territorial system of taxation.29 To illustrate this system using
the example in the preceding paragraph, Acme Corporation would pay
the United States corporate tax rate (35%) on its income earned in the
United States, pay the French corporate tax rate (34.43%) on its income
earned in France, and the Irish corporate tax rate (12.5%) on its income
earned in Ireland, ceterisparibus. 0 In this illustration and in practice,
a territorial system would decrease a corporation's tax bill, and therefore, seemingly reduce its incentive to invert. 3 1
Corporations invert to reduce the prohibitive effects of the
American worldwide taxation system. 3 2 This was one McDermott,
Inc.'s key motivations when it decided to invert to Panama in the early
1980s.33 McDermott stated that inverting to Panama allowed it "to retain, re-invest and redeploy earnings from operations outside the
See Eric L. Talley, CorporateInversions and the Unbundling
ofRegulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1661 (2015).
27 See
id
28 See
id
29 See id at 1661, n.34. The OECD nations that employ
a worldwide taxation structure are Chile, Greece, Ireland, Israel, South Korea, and Mexico, Poland,
and the United States. Id.
30 See Table II.1. CorporateIncome Tax Rate, supra note 14.
31 See Capurso, supra note 13, at 595-96.
32 See Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration:
Tax Diversion
Through Inversion, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 807, 821 (2015).
3 See id The McDermott inversion is widely recognized as the first American inversion. Id.
26
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United States without subjecting such earnings to United States income tax." 34 By successfully inverting, McDermott was able to evade
the American worldwide taxation scheme and relieve an estimated
$200 million from its tax burden. 35 Further, McDermott's merger proceeded tax-free.36 Opening up the global market for tax domiciles, the
McDermott inversion paved 37the way for future waves of similarly motivated corporate inversions.
II. How WE ARRIVED HERE: HISTORICAL CONTEXT

In the context of corporate inversions, innovation and regulation is an ongoing game of cat and mouse between businesses and regulators. 38 To provide legal context for the upcoming incentive analysis,
this article will evaluate two key events that shaped the practice and
regulation of tax inversion: 1) The seminal inversion by McDermott,
Inc. and the resulting case, Bhada v. Commissioner;9 and 2) the
Obama Administration Treasury regulations. 40 In each illustration,
American corporations utilized regulatory loopholes, and the government attempted to counter by closing the loophole to prevent future
inversions.
A. Legal Background: Bhada Beginnings
The McDermott, Inc. inversion41 is important to illustrate the
motivation to escape the worldwide taxation regime. It also serves to
illustrate the mechanics of a corporate inversion and the early framework through which courts analyzed the legality of inversions. 42 The
McDermott inversion became the subject of Bhada v. Commissioner,
a case that considered how the shares received by McDermott's shareholders in its acquisition should be taxed.4 3
34 Id.; Bhada v. Comm'r., 89 T.C. 959, 961 (T.C. 1987), aff'd, 892 F.2d 39
(6th Cir. 1989).
35 See Hwang, supra note 32, at 822.
36 See id.
37 See id. at 821. McDermott's inversion was upheld by the Sixth Circuit in
Bhada, 892 F.2d at 40. See infra notes 38-59 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Bhada and the preceding Tax Court decision.
38 See Hwang, supra note 32 (categorizing the history of tax inversion into
four "generations of inversions" and subsequent government responses).
3 Bhada v. Comm'r., 892 F.2d 39 (6th Cir. 1989).
40 See Zients & Hanlon, supra note 5.
41 See supra Part
I.B.
42 See, e.g., Bhada, 892 F.2d at 40.
43 See Bhada, 89 T.C. at 960.
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Prior to the inversion, McDermott, Inc. was the Delawarebased parent corporation of the McDermott Group and McDermott International, Inc. was a Panama-based subsidiary. 44 In October 1982,
McDermott reorganized.4 5 As part of the reorganization, McDermott
International, Inc. offered cash and its common stock in exchange for
shares of McDermott, Inc.'s common stock.4 6 Upon the stock sale,
McDermott International, Inc. assumed majority control over McDermott, Inc. 4 7 As McDermott's prospectus stated, "the principal purpose
of the reorganization is to enable the McDermott Group to retain, reinvest and redeploy earnings from operations outside the United States
without subjecting such earnings to United States income tax."4 8 Following this transaction, several shareholder-petitioners sought review
of the tax status of their shares.4 9 The issue before the Tax Court was
"whether the shares of International common stock received by petitioners in exchange for McDermott common stock constitute 'property' within the meaning of [Internal Revenue Code] section
304(a)(2)(A)."so Section 304(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code
stated:
(2) Acquisition by subsidiary. -- For purposes of sections

302 and 303, if -(A) in return for property, one corporation acquires from
a shareholder of another corporation stock in such other
corporation, and
(B) the issuing corporation controls the acquiring corporation, then such property shall be treatedas a distribution in redemption of the stock of the issuing corporation. 51
The I.R.S. Commissioner argued that the shares received by the
petitioners were "property" as defined in Section 304, and thus, the
shareholders received a taxable distribution. 5 2 If the Tax Court classified the shares as "property," the shareholders would be required to

See
See
See
47 See
48
44

45
46

id. at 961.
id
id
id. at 962.

Id. (emphasis added).

49
5 0 See id at 960.

1d; see Hwang, supra note 32, at 822,
n.74.
26 U.S.C.S. § 304(a)(2) (2012) (emphasis added).
52 See Hwang, supranote 32, at 822, n.74.
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pay significant taxes on the distribution they received. 5 3
In determining that Section 304 was inapplicable, the Tax
Court held that, as the term "property" and "distribution" were defined
in Section 317(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, "the term distribution
... does not exclusively refer to a distribution by a corporation to its
shareholders with respect to its stock." 5 4 As a result, the Tax Court
concluded that "[McDermott] International 'distributed' its own stock
to petitioners in the December 1982 exchange, and that such stock is
5
not to be deemed property," so Section 304 did not apply.5
Acknowledging that this case was a case of first impression and
that the issues were "both complex and confusing," the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's holding.56 As victors,
McDermott and its shareholders completed the transaction tax free and
enjoyed $200 million in tax savings.
In response to Bhada and the newfound threat that tax inversions posed to corporate income tax revenues, Congress acted to make
transactions like McDermott's taxable by adding Section 1248(i) to the
Internal Revenue Code.5 8 If it was in place in 1982, Section 1248(i)
could have stymied the benefits of McDermott's inversion by treating
the foreign corporation's earnings as taxable dividends. 59 While this
Congressional action served to quell one method of tax inversion, the
stage had been set for future cor orate inversions carved out in the legal ambiguities in the tax code.
B. 2014-2016 Treasury Regulations: Closing the Loopholesfor

Good?
The Obama Administration's Treasury regulations serve as a
modern example of government action aimed at reducing the incidence
of tax inversions.61 Enacted between 2014 and 2016, the regulations
sought to close loopholes that allowed tax inversions by targeting two
notable practices: 1) Using "tricks" to evade the 80% ownership rule;

s3 See id. The potential tax savings for McDermott were $200 million. Id.
54 See Bhada, 89 T.C. at 965.
5 Id.
56 Bhada v. Comm'r., 892 F.3d 39, 41-43 (6th Cir. 1989), aff'g 89 T.C. 959
(T.C. 1987).
5 See Hwang, supra note 32, at 822.
58 See id.; see also 26 U.S.C. § 1248(i) (2012).
5 See Hwang, supra note 32, at 823.
6
o See id.
61 See Capurso, supra note 13, at 593.
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62
and 2) "earnings stripping."

1. Strengthening the 80% Ownership Rule
When first introduced in 2004, the 80% ownership rule stated
that owners who "sold" a United States corporation to a foreign subsidiary must own less than 80% of the resulting, post-inversion entity. Before the 80% ownership rule applies, regulations provide:
"[A]n inverted company is subject to potential adverse tax consequences if, after the transaction: (1) [L]ess than 25 percent of the
new multinational entity's business activity is in the home country of
the new foreign parent, and (2) the shareholders of the former U.S.
parent end up owning at least 60 percent of the shares of the new foreign parent." 6 4
If both prerequisites are satisfied, then the question becomes
whether the former United States parent corporation owns 80% or
more of the new entity.65 If the former United States parent owns more
than 80% of the new entity, then it is subject to the American corporate
income tax rate, and not the rates of the new foreign parent corpora66
tion. The intent of the 80% ownership rule was to end "shifts to tax
havens where no real business activity took place" by eliminating the
tax benefits of the inversion. 6 7
While the 80% ownership rule was a major step in attempting
to regulate and slow inversions, it required strengthening to curb
"tricks" that corporations used to circumvent the rule.68 The Treasury

62 You Don't Get to Pick Your Tax Rate. Neither Should Corporations,
WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 26, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/share/the-

facts-on-inversions [hereinafter You Don 't Get to Pick Your Tax Rate].
See id.; Donald J. Marples & Jane G. Gravelle, CorporateExpatriation,
Inversions, and Mergers: Tax Issues, CONG. BUDGET SERV. 6 (Apr. 27, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43568.pdf; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7874(b) (2012) (stating
that "a foreign corporation shall be treated for purposes of this title as domestic corporation if such corporation would be surrogate foreign corporation if subsection
(a)(2) were applied by substituting '80 percent' for '60 percent"').
64 FactSheet: Additional Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/j1028 1.aspx.
65 See id; see also 26 U.S.C. § 7874(b) (2016).
6 See 26 U.S.C. § 7874(b) (2016) (stating 80% rule and when "inverted
corporations [will be] treated as domestic corporations").
67 See Marples & Gravelle, supra
note 63, at 7.
68 See You Don't Get to Pick Your Tax
Rate, supra note 62.
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took corresponding action to eliminate these tricks in 2014.69 For example, to bypass the 80% ownership rule, a corporation could either
"[inflate] the size of the foreign merger partner" or "[shrink] the size
of the [domestic firm]." 70 The regulations cracked down on the corporate practice of transferring passive assets to the foreign merging partner to increase its perceived ownership.7 1 Similarly, the regulations targeted the practice of paying huge dividends from the domestic
corporation before the merger to decrease its perceived ownership. 72
The Treasury regulations bolstered the 80% ownership rule by disregarding passive assets if at least 50% of the foreign corporation's assets are passive and disregarding "pre-inversion extraordinary dividends."73
2. Curbing "Earnings Stripping"
In 2016, the Treasury enacted additional regulations that,
among other things, targeted a practice known colloquially as "earnings stripping." 7 4 Earnings stripping occurs when a United States corporation takes an internal loan from its foreign parent, allowing the
domestic corporation to deduct interest payments from its tax bill and
allowing both corporations to "shift" the earnings from the domestic
corporation to the foreign parent where the income is reported under
the more favorable tax regime. 75
The Treasury took aim on this practice by targeting loans that
caused large interest deductions and increasing the audit power of the
Internal Revenue Service.76 The regulations were important because
earnings stripping is one of the methods that corporations typically use
to invert.7 7 By making it harder to do so, the Treasury made inversions
See Marples & Gravelle, supra note 63, at 9.
Id. at 10-11.
71 See id. at
10.
72
See id. at 11.
73 Fact Sheet: Treasury Actions to Rein in Corporate Tax Inversions, U.S.
69

70

(Sept. 22, 2014), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2645.aspx. "The transfer of properties or liabilities (including by contribution or distribution) shall be disregarded if such transfers are part of
a plan a principal purpose of which is to avoid the purposes of this section." 26 U.S.C.
§ 7874(c)(4) (2016).
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY

74 You Don't Get to Pick Your Tax Rate, supra note 61.
7

Id.; Capurso, supra note 13, at 586.

TreasuryAnnounces Additional Action to CurbInversions, Address Earnings Stripping, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY (Apr. 4, 2016), https://www.treas7

ury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl0405.aspx.
77 See Capurso, supra note 13, at 592.
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less desirable to corporations. 7 8
3. Evaluating the Efficacy of the Recent Treasury Regulations
While it is unclear how many inversions were prevented by
these waves of Treasury action, there is evidence that several domestic
corporations called off mergers in the wake of these regulations.7 9
Most notably, the government earned a major victory against tax inversion when pharmaceutical goliaths Pfizer and Allegan PLC terminated a $160 billion merger that would have inverted Pfizer to Ireland
days after the Treasury announced their 2016 regulations.so Time will
tell whether the regulations will bring other tax inversions to their
knees, but the Treasury's recent actions put up a strong fight against
modern tax inversion methods even while Congress is deadlocked.
III. GETTING THE BILL? How TAx INVERSION AFFECTS CONSUMERS

The effects of tax inversion reach beyond business and political
elites and touch consumers. While corporations can save millions of
dollars through tax inversion, negative externalities pain certain classes of consumers. Consumers, in their roles as taxpayers, small business owners, or shareholders, are not insulated from tax inversion.
A. Do Consumers and Small Businesses Pay or Prosperwhen Corporations Invert?
In evaluating the effects of tax inversion, especially from the
consumer-taxpayer perspective, a primary concern is how the government will replace and manage the loss of billions of dollars in tax revenue abroad.8 ' As stated in the onset, former President Obama opined
that the lost tax revenue takes from the coffers of public schools, college financial aid, and public works programs. President Donald
Trump is steadfast in his desire to bring this money back to the United
States.8 3
78

Id.

79 See Marples & Gravelle, supra note 63, at 9.
80 See Kristen Hallam, Cynthia Koons & Zachary Tracer, Pfizer Confirms
Termination ofProposed$160 Billion Allergan Merger, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 6,2016),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-06/pfizer-allergan-end- 1 60-billion-merger-amid-new-tax-rules.
81
See Zients & Hanlon, supra note 5.
82
See id
83 See Trump's Tax Plan, supranote
9.
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It is unclear whether claims that the "average" taxpayer picks
up the tab for corporate inverters are political posturing or an ominous
warning, but regardless of sentiment, to maintain the current levels of
federal expenditures, revenues must be similarly maintained. 8 4 What is
clear, though, is that corporate inversions allow corporations to significantly trim their tax bill, while individuals and small businesses remain bound to the rates in the United States tax code.8 5 On the margin,
small business owners pay more in corporate income taxes because
they continue to pay the existing 35% corporate tax rate, while multinational corporations who can afford to invert can reduce their tax rate
considerably by seeking out tax havens. 8 6
The potential burden that "ordinary" taxpayers and small business owners bear to offset the cost of tax inversion is not only bad for
optics-it risks disproportionately hurting the middle class. Further,
tax inversion is a competitive advantage for multinational corporations
that compete with small, domestic businesses, and there is a risk that
7
inversions can force small businesses out of a market.8
However, on the other hand, consumers may benefit from
lower prices that come when an inverting company has reduced its
costs by lowering its tax burden.8 8 This positive externality of tax inversion exists in theory, but data will be required to confirm whether
it is an actual effect of tax inversion or an idealism that only serves to
increase a corporation's bottom line. Specific research should be conducted to quantify the burdens and benefits that tax inversion causes
the American consumer and domestic small businesses.
B. ShareholdersLawyer Up
Inverting allows corporations to save millions of dollars because it reduces their tax burdens. 89 But how does this affect the corporations' shareholders? One of the highest profile inversions of the
See David Brodwin, Corporate Tax Inversions Leave You with the Bill,
US NEWS (Aug. 1, 2014), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/20 14/08/01 /corporate-inversion-tax-avoidance-hurts-small-businesses-and84

consumers.
See id.
See Hwang, supra note 32, at 848.
87 See id. (stating that market over-consolidation caused by tax inversion
can cause monopolistic markets, meaning public must bear resulting externality of
decreased competition).
88 See Hale E. Sheppard, Fight or Flight of U.S.-Based MultinationalBusithe Causesfor, Effects of and Solutions to the CorporateInversion
Analyzing
nesses:
Trend, 23 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 551, 563 (2003).
89 See generally Hwang, supra note 32.
8
86
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last several years featured a merger between Wisconsin-based Johnson
Controls, Inc. (hereinafter, "JCI") and Ireland-based Tyco International. 90 The benefit to JCI is clear-it estimates that domiciling in Ireland will save the corporation an estimated $150 million in taxes. 9 1 But
the merger garnered the ire of both 2016 Presidential candidates, and
politicians are not alone in their discontent. 92 The JCI-Tyco inversion
left many longtime shareholders feeling "betrayed" by the unexpected
tax burden they faced. 93
On August 16, 2016, JCI shareholders filed a lawsuit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin
against certain senior executive officers of JCI, all members of the
Board of Directors of JCI, JCI itself, and Tyco. The plaintiff-shareholders allege that for JCI to enjoy the tax benefits of the inversionwhich JCI stated would be tax-free to Tyco shareholders and taxable
to JCI shareholders-" JCI diluted the stock to a point that any tax
liability for reincorporating in Ireland shifted to the shareholders." 95
The plaintiff-shareholders further allege that public shareholders and
shareholders with potential exposure to capital gain taxation are injured by the merger.96
On January 25, 2017, the plaintiff-shareholders moved for a
preliminary injunction on their count alleging that "the individual defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the plaintiffs by failing to
disclose, or failing to seek advice about, several issues" including potential capital gains consequences. 97 The plaintiff-shareholders' motion was denied "because the plaintiffs did not demonstrate that the
90 See Thomas Content, Investors Ask Court to Block Big JCI Tax Bite,
MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL (Oct. 4,2016), http://www.jsonline.com/story/money/business/energy/2016/10/04/investors-ask-court-block-big-jci-tax-bite/91549056/.
91 See id.
92 See Craig Gilbert, Hillary Clinton slams Johnson Controls-Tyco deal,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 27, 2016), http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/hillary-clinton-slams-johnson-controls-tyco-deal-b99659492zl-

366736541.html.
9 Content, supranote 90.
94 See Gumm v. Molinaroli, 16-CV-1093-PP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
157155, at **2-3 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 14, 2016).
9 Id. at *3.
96 See id.

97 Gumm v. Molinaroli, 16-CV-1093-PP, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10320, at
**5-6 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 25, 2017) ("The motion for preliminary injunction states that
all of these alleged breaches of fiduciary duty have resulted in a situation in which
the plaintiffs are facing large capital gains tax consequences for the 2016 tax year,
which, they argue, constitute irreparable harm to them, and which cannot be remedied at law.").
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monetary damages available as a remedy was inadequate to address
the harm they allege." 98 To date, the litigation is still pending. 9 9
Similar shareholder-initiated litigation against inverted or inverting corporations has sprung up around the country. 0 0 Despite the
mixed results of these early shareholder lawsuits, the recent emergence
of cases shows that corporate inversions may be beneficial to the corporation at the expense of its shareholders. In continuing to assess the
effect corporate inversions have on consumers, specifically shareholders, it will be imperative to closely monitor these and other lawsuits,
as well as the resulting change in the stock price of corporation following inversion. Litigation and largescale stock sell offs remain important deterrents that shareholders can hold over the heads of inverting corporations if circumstances sour. If litigants earn favorable
results against inverting corporations through actions under securities
or consumer fraud laws, it is possible that the incidence of tax inversion may slow because of corporations' interests in reducing their exposure.
IV. CARROT OR STICK: INCENTIVE AND INTEREST ANALYSIS AND
POLICY REVIEW

For policies to curb the undesirable effects of tax inversion effectively, they must target the core incentives of the business and political actors. However, no policy decision exists in a vacuum, and the
interests of consumers must be carefully considered before any policy
recommendation is made. Policy decisions that have distortionary effects on businesses will undoubtedly affect the markets in which consumers transact. Positive or adverse changes to the price of goods and
services, employment outcomes, or individual income taxation must
98

id. at *30.

99

See id.

See Rubinstein v. Gonzalez, 14-cv-9465, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34214,
at *16 (N.D. Ill. March 10, 2017) (pending class action lawsuit by shareholders of
AbbVie, Inc. against corporation alleging securities fraud based on statements made
by AbbVie which "allegedly downplayed the importance of the tax inversion to the
proposed merger" with Shire (an Irish company) that "were false and misleading");
see also C&J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' & Sanitation Emps.' Ret.
Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1052-57 (Del. 2014) (reversing preliminary injunction earned
by class of shareholders that enjoined shareholder vote on a proposed merger between United States based C&J and Bermuda based Nabors Industries Ltd.); City of
Riviera Beach Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Mylan N.V., 15-cv-821, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62422, at **2-5 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2016) (dismissing plaintiff-shareholders'
complaint against Mylan, Inc. seeking relief for shares that were allegedly cancelled
following corporate inversion and merger with Abbott Laboratories).
100
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be measured.
The major proposed solutions to curbing tax inversion are
grouped into two categories: "carrots" and "sticks."
A. Rewarding with "Carrots"
For the purpose of this section, "carrots" are policy proposals
that seek to incentivize corporations not to invert by making the United
States a more attractive location to domicile. Drawing on the discussion in Part I herein of the two primary factors that encourage corporations to invert, this section focuses on how adjusting either the corporate income tax rate or the United States taxation regime incentivizes
the actors in a tax inversion.
1. Lowering the Corporate Income Tax Rate
Reducing the United States corporate income tax rate from
35% plays to the purest incentive of an inverting corporation: decreasing its tax burden.'01 As the highest corporate income tax rate in the
OECD, the current rate is not competitive. 102 But how much should the
rate be reduced? To answer this question, the incentives and interests
of both businesses and the government must be analyzed.
To minimize costs, the domestic tax rate must be low enough
to incentivize a corporation to remain domiciled in the United States,
but this does not mean that the United States should lower the corporate tax rate to a rate lower than that of the most competitive tax haven.
Merging with a foreign corporation causes the domestic corporation to
incur significant transaction and information costs.103 The deluge of
regulation and public scrutiny aimed at tax inversion means that corporations can no longer shop for the lowest foreign tax rate and simply
change their headquarters' mailing address to enjoy the benefits of inverting.
For an inversion to be efficient, the tax savings must eclipse the
transaction and information costs incurred when it inverts. For example, if Acme Corporation can save $50 million on its corporate tax bill
annually by inverting to Ireland, but the cost of finding and acquiring
a merging partner in Ireland that will satisfy the existing regulations
'0 See Sheppard, supra note 88, at 571.
102 See Table 11.1. CorporateIncome
Tax Rate, supra note 14.
103 See Hwang, supra note 32, at 838. Transaction costs include the costs of
the merger and litigation. Information costs include the cost of compliance with antiinversion laws and the cost of compliance with foreign governance laws. The aforementioned costs are examples, and this list is not exhaustive.
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costs $200 million, it is probably inefficient for that corporation to invert unless the corporation mitigates its ongoing transaction costs. Notwithstanding, this transaction surely would not be efficient in the shortrun.
The recent waves of Treasury regulations targeted this incentive by increasing the transaction and information costs that corporations shoulder when they choose to invert. For example, by adding additional regulatory layers to the existing corporate legal structure,
corporations are now forced to expel greater compliance costs. While
the government may have incentives to lower the corporate tax rate, it
does not want to reduce the corporate tax rate below the efficient
level. 104 In other words, if it becomes inefficient for most corporations
to invert when the tax rate is 25%, a Congressional reduction of the tax
rate to 15% means that there is 10% worth of lost tax revenue that
could have been retained. Given the Congressional deadlock that exists, the greater the reduction to the corporate tax rate, the less likely it
is that Congress can successfully pass any reduction. 05
The consumer benefits of lowering the corporate tax rate add
an additional wrinkle into the debate as to what rate is optimal for all
parties. A 2010 Heritage Foundation study concluded that, if the corporate income tax rate was reduced to 25%, an average of 531,000 jobs
would be added to the private sector annually, real gross domestic
product would increase $132 billion annually, and the after-tax income
for a family of four would increase $2,484 annually.1 0 6 These benefits
to consumers may move the needle towards lowering the corporate income tax rates further, as long as the loss of tax revenue and the negative effects therefrom are eclipsed by the benefits. If this administration can facilitate large scale tax reform, as President Trump would
like, the optimal rate must be determined by balancing the incentives
and interests of the corporate-political-consumer triumvirate.107
2. Shift from a Worldwide to Territorial Taxation Regime
Aligning the United States tax structure with that of most the
OECD nations by transitioning to a territorial system is heralded as the
See Capurso, supra note 13, at 597.
1o' See id. at 598-99 (partisan divide prevents "the best option to keep com104

panies from inverting:" corporate tax reform).
06 See id.; John Ligon & Karen Campbell, The Economic Impact of a 25
Percent Corporate Income Tax Rate, HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 2, 2010),
25
-percent-corporate-inhttp://www.heritage.org/taxes/report/the-economic-impactcome-tax-rate.
107 See Trump's Tax Plan, supra note 9.
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"obvious" solution.
Under a territorial taxation system, the United
States could continue to tax domestic earnings at 35%, but it would
lose taxation power over income earned abroad.1 09 For a corporation
that earns the lion's share of its income in the United States, the switch
would eliminate the incentive to invert.
Most critics argue that, to be effective, the tax regime switch
must be coupled with additional regulation.1 10 For example, on its own
the switch to a territorial system does not address earning stripping.]i
Further, the shift would need to be executed through large scale tax
reform.
From a consumer perspective, this shift may cause bitterness
since individual income earned abroad is taxed "worldwide."112 In
other words, if Tonya Taxpayer earns $1 million in Spain, she must
declare this income on her United States tax return, and the income is
subject to American taxation.113 To ensure equality and protect Congressional interest in satisfying constituents, a similar shift in the individual tax code may deserve consideration.
B. Punishingwith "Sticks"
For the purpose of this section, "stick" policies seek to quell
tax inversion by punishing companies that have inverted or may invert
through punitive measures.
If tax inversion is already widely viewed as undesirable, is
there any merit to policies banning or criminalizing tax inversion?
While such policies would threaten to punish inverting companies, it
is doubtful that the benefits of punitive action would outweigh the
costs.
Regarding federal tax inversion bans, three concerns arise.
First, defining tax inversion would pose difficulties to legislatures, especially given that the practice is constantly evolving and taking new
forms as new laws are passed.1 14 Second, given the frequent evolution
and creation of new inversion schemes, regulations would need to be
108 Capurso, supra note 13, at 594; see also How to Stop the Inversion Perversion, ECONOMIST (July 26, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21608751 -restricting-companies-moving-abroad-no-substitute-corporate-tax-reform-how-stop.
109 See Capurso, supra note 13, at 584.
110
See id. at 595.
"' See id.
112 Income from Abroad is Taxable, IRS
(Oct. 7, 2016),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/income-from-abroad-is-taxable.
113 See
id.

114 See Capurso, supra note 13, at 599.
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frequently reenacted and revised. Third, a ban threatens to place unnecessary and cumbersome regulation on non-nefarious business alienability and mergers and acquisitions.' 15 The cost of frequent legislative catch-up and potential ill effects on legal mergers and
acquisitions likely outweighs the benefits that a ban might inspire.
Similar issues arise regarding criminalization; the cost to Department
of Justice, Internal Revenue Service, or other governmental agencies
tasked with prosecuting inversions would be egregious compared to
more targeted, incentive-based solutions.
Notwithstanding, legislators have sought to implement other
punitive measures. For example, several states have sponsored leislation that would ban state contracts with inverted corporations." Illinois Democratic Senator Dick Durban has proposed similar legislation
that bans federal contracts with inverted corporations.'
The efficacy of any punitive policy is dependent on balancing
the effect on the incentives of business versus the cost to consumers.
Based on the foregoing analysis of proposed bans and criminalization
of tax inversion, it appears that such measures fail to target the core
incentives of corporations, and thus, will be inefficient at curbing tax
inversion.
V. TURNING INVERSIONS UPSIDE DowN

Despite bipartisan opposition of tax inversion, there is no quick
fix. When corporations invert, both positive and negative externalities
affect American consumers. While the effects are largely negative,
generations of reinvention and discovery of new loopholes has led to a
system where inverting corporations are always one step ahead of regulatory bodies seeking to stymie the practice. The recent Treasury regulations provided much needed attention to new iterations of tax inversion while Congress remains gridlocked, but only time will tell how
effective these rules are at stopping inversions and how consumers are
subsequently affected.
The major policy tools-reducing the corporate income tax rate
and transitioning from a worldwide to a territorial tax system (the "carrots")-inspire confidence by addressing some of the key incentives
of businesses, politicians, and consumers and boast positive results,
but the feasibility of large scale tax reform remains uncertain in the
current political climate. In addition to the ongoing Treasury regulations, activism by financial consumers of multinational corporations
115

See id.

116 See Sheppard, supra note 88, at 585.
117 See Brodwin, supra note 84.

390

Loyola ConsumerLaw Review

[Vol. 29:3

and shareholders may disincentivize inversion. Litigation and other
pressure on corporations will not only increase the costs of inversion,
but will require these entities to be accountable to their owners, especially when inversions devalue and dilute shares.
The current taxation and regulatory structures incentivize corporations to seek out countries with the lowest corporate tax rates.
While consumers may benefit from the resulting lower prices in theory,
shareholders, taxpayers, and small businesses bear various costs. Congress must take steps to curb the growing trend of tax inversions,
whether by carrot or stick, to prevent massive loss of corporate income
tax revenues; in the meantime, the United States Consumer is hurt by
these tax inversions.

